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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES WEBB, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890256-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are 
as set forth previously in Appellant's Brief at pages 2-7. The 
Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to the Respondent's 
Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WEBB WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL DUE TO A CONFLICT OF INTEREST RESULTING 
FROM THE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION'S JOINT 
REPRESENTATION OF WEBB AND CO-DEFENDANT HUMPHREY. 
Strickland and its progeny are determinative in an 
ineffective assistance of counsel argument. A different rule 
applies when a defendant's claim is based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest in 
representation. The general rule, with respect to the federal 
constitutional guarantee of representation is: (a) if a 
potential conflict is brought to the trial court's attention 
prior to or during trial and the trial court fails to act, the 
mere existence of a potential or possible conflict will warrant 
reversal without any further showing of prejudice. Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); (b) if, however, the conflict is 
not brought to the trial court's attention but is raised for 
the first time on appeal, the defendant "must demonstrate the 
existence of an actual conflict of interest.M Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
The State agrees in its Response that Strickland is 
inapplicable when an appellant claims ineffective assistance of 
counsel due to a conflict of interest. (Br. of Resp. at 7). 
The State also agrees with the rules distilled from Holloway 
and Cuyler concerning the showing appellant must make under the 
federal constitution to warrant reversal for a conflict of 
interest claim. (Br. of Resp. at 8). 
The State makes three main arguments: (1) Webb failed 
to raise a potential conflict of interest claim until after 
trial, thus, he must establish an actual conflict of interest; 
(2) a Legal Defender Association is not per se prohibited from 
representing co-defendants, thus, Webb is unable to establish 
either an actual or potential conflict of interest; and (3) 
even if a conflict of interest existed, appellant's claim of a 
conflict of interest must fail because appellant has failed to 
show any resulting prejudice. The first argument reflects a 
dispute over the application of the law to the facts of this 
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case, while the second and third arguments are erroneous 
conclusions of law. 
A. A Potential Conflict of Interest Was 
Adequately Raised by Webb at the Trial Level. 
Webb's position is that a potential conflict of 
interest was specifically raised in his Motion for a New Trial 
and was intertwined with his earlier repeated requests to the 
trial court for severance from his co-defendant; thus, under 
Holloway, his conviction should be reversed. 
While the State seems to agree that a potential 
conflict of interest existed, and that Webb raised the issue in 
his Motion for a New Trial, (Brief of Resp. at 8), the State, 
nevertheless, argues that as in Cuyler, Webb's conflict of 
interest claim was untimely requiring that he prove an actual 
conflict of interest. Cuyler is distinguishable. 
In Cuyler, while associated counsel represented three 
defendants, each defendant was tried separately; thus, the 
Court stated: "The provision of separate trials for Sullivan 
and his co-defendants significantly reduced the potential for 
divergence in their interests.*' Ld. at 337. Here, Webb and 
co-defendant Humphrey were tried together. 
Additionally, in Cuyler, nothing in the procedural 
circumstances indicated that the trial court had a duty to make 
inquiries regarding a potential conflict of interest. Id. 
Here, Webb's Motion for Severance, and co-defendant Humphrey's 
Motions for Conflict of Interest and Trial Separation were 
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sufficient to alert the trial court to the potential for 
conflict. 
Finally, Sullivan failed to raise the issue in his 
post conviction motions raising the issue for the first time 
when he petitioned for collateral relief under the state 
statutory Post Conviction Hearing Act, following the state 
supreme court's affirmation of his conviction. In the case 
before this Court, the record is undisputed that Webb raised 
the issue at the trial level when he moved for a new trial. 
(Br. of Resp. at 8). 
Significantly, State v. Tippetts, 584 P.2d 892 (Utah 
1978), supports Wrebb's contention that because he raised the 
issue in a Motion for a New Trial he need not prove an actual 
conflict of interest. In Tippets, when co-defendant Lopez' 
attorney became ill on the day of the trial, Tippets attorney 
agreed to jointly represent the defendants rather than delay 
the trial with a continuation. Tippets was convicted and 
appealed, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel due to his trial attorney's conflict of interest. 
While the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision the 
Court stated: 
Tippetts did not object to Esplin 
undertaking to defend Lopez nor did Tippetts 
move for a new trial or to set aside the 
verdict. The issue of whether Tippets had 
been deprived of his right to effective 
counsel was first raised on appeal, 
(emphasis added.) 
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Id. at 893. 
The Court's holding implicitly directs that a conflict 
of interest claim should be raised at the trial level, 
specifically, in a Motion for a New Trial. Webb raised his 
conflict of interest claim in a Motion For a New Trial. 
This Court's statement in State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697 
(Utah 1980), is applicable to the facts of this case and 
refutes the State's argument that trial counsel failed to raise 
the potential conflict in a timely manner: 
We do not find the State's argument 
persuasive. . . The attorneys responsible 
for raising an objection did not do so. And 
we cannot assume that under those 
circumstances the attorneys advised 
defendant of the conflict, nor that they 
advised him that he must object on his own 
behalf to avoid waiving his constitutional 
right. 'The law will not assume that 
counsel has advised his client of his 
inadequacies or those of his associates, 
(citation omitted). 
Id. at 699. 
While the facts of Smith are distinguishable, the 
reasoning behind the Court's holding is appropriate in this 
case. Webb should not be penalized for his trial counsel's 
failure to formally advise the Court before trial of the 
potential conflict, especially where Webb and his co-defendant 
adequately raised the issue pro se and in other motions. 
The State's argument that Webb's counsel failed to 
raise a potential conflict before the trial ignores the facts 
of this case and the realities of the legal system. Webb's 
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privately retained counsel withdrew from the case after filing 
a Motion to Sever Webb's trial from that of his co-defendant, 
Humphrey. This Motion was based on the lack of evidence 
against Webb as the accomplice compared to the stronger 
evidence against Humphrey as the actual robber. The Court 
failed to rule on the Motion and appointed the Legal Defender 
Association (hereafter "L.D.A.") to represent both Webb and 
Humphrey. At this point, a potential conflict arose based on 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, the A.B.A. Standards for 
Criminal Justice/ and substantial case law warning against the 
appearance of impropriety and joint representation in criminal 
defense case. See Commonwealth v. Westbrook, 400 A.2d 160 
(Penn. 1979); State v. Robinson, 662 P.2d 1341 (N. Mex. 1983). 
B. An. Actual Conflict of Interest Existed 
Between Webb's Counsel and Counsel for 
Co-defendant Humphrey. 
Appellant argues in his opening brief that assuming, 
arguendo, Webb failed to adequately raise the potential 
conflict of interest at the trial level, his conviction should, 
nevertheless, be reversed because an actual conflict of 
interest existed when attorneys from the L.D.A. represented 
both Webb and co-defendant Humphrey at trial. Appellant admits 
that while joint representation by associated attorneys is not 
per se prohibited, joint representation in the case of 
co-defendants is suspect and should be examined. State v. 
Smith, supra. 
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In this case, Webb admits that the original joint 
representation by the L.D.A. following the withdrawal of his 
privately retained counsel was not a conflict per se. A Motion 
to Sever the trial of Webb and his co-defendant was before the 
court. The actual conflict existed when the trial court failed 
to rule on Webb's Motion to Sever and Webb and his co-defendant 
were jointly represented at trial by the L.D.A. in spite of the 
evidence and Webb's desire to impeach the testimony of his 
co-defendant. See People v. Robinson, 402 N.E.2d 157 (111. 
1980) (conflict raised by L.D.A.'s joint representation of 
co-defendants in a murder trial cured by severance of their 
trials.) 
Respondents cite State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 
1986), and State v. Heaps, slip op. No. 16264 (S.Ct. filed 
October 31, 1979)(unpublished), and argue that Utah courts have 
addressed the issue of joint representation of co-defendants, 
holding that such representation does not constitute an actual 
conflict; however, Barella, and Heaps are distinguishable from 
this case. 
In Barella, the appellant and a co-defendant were 
arrested and charged with distributing a controlled substance 
for value. Barella was convicted while his co-defendant plead 
guilty to a lesser charge. Both defendants were represented by 
attorneys from the L.D.A.. On appeal, Barella alleged, for the 
first time, that a conflict existed between his attorney and 
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the attorney who represented his co-defendant. This Court held 
that a conflict did not exist. 
Barella differs from the case currently before the 
court in that Barella and his co-defendant were not tried 
together, the conflict was not raised at trial, and there was 
nothing in the record to support either an actual or potential 
conflict of interest. Here, Webb and his co-defendant were 
tried together in spite of Webb's Motion for Severance, and 
Webb's desire to impeach the credibility of his co-defendant. 
In Heaps, a case decided before the Holloway/Cuyler 
line of cases, the appellant's claim was based on the fact that 
he was represented in pre-trial proceedings by the L.D.A., who 
also represented an untried co-defendant. Rejecting the 
appellant's argument, this Court held that to prevail on a 
conflict of interest claim, appellant must show that "there was 
a conflict of interest which in some manner may have reacted to 
the defendant's detriment." Id. at 2. 
In this case, as opposed to Heaps, there was "a 
conflict of interest which in some manner may have reacted to 
the defendant's detriment." Webb and his co-defendant were 
tried jointly in spite of Webb's attempts to have his case 
severed from his co-defendants in order to fully pursue his 
individual defense and impeach the credibility of his 
co-defendant. 
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In his opening brief, Webb chronicles how the conflict 
of interest was apparent at trial: (a) The joint theory of 
defense pursued by his counsel in spite of the substantial 
amount of evidence against Humphrey, including eyewitness 
identifications; (b) the L.D.A.'s failure to pursue the Motion 
to Sever filed by Webb's privately retained attorney; (c) the 
lack of evidence against Webb; and (d) evidence that Webb was 
out of state on the day of the robbery (T. 508). 
The State responds that counsel's strategy cannot be 
used to determine whether counsel was effective. While the 
foregoing may be true, it is irrelevant. Webb offers the trial 
record and trial strategy to establish the existence of a 
conflict, a totally separate consideration. 
While a per se conflict did not exist in the L.D.A.'s 
joint representation of Webb and his co-defendant, an actual 
conflict existed based on the fact that co-defendants with 
adverse interests were represented by the L.D.A. "Members of 
the same association may not represent defendants with 
conflicting interests, as there is a strong likelihood that 
both have been privy to the confidences of both defendants." 
State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1980). 
C. Appellant Need Not Establish Prejudice to 
Prevail On His Claim That He Was Denied 
Effective Assistance of Counsel Due to a 
Conflict of Interest. 
Appellant establishes early in his opening brief that 
its legal framework to analyze ineffective assistance of 
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counsel due to a conflict4of interest differs significantly 
from a traditional ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. 
The State agreed in their responsive brief that Holloway and 
Cuyler were the applicable standard rather than Strickland; 
however, the State concludes its first argument by citing State 
v, Geary, 707 P.2d 645 (Utah 1985), and stating, "In the 
absence of a showing of prejudice, an ineffective assistance 
claim must fail." (Brief of Resp., at 16). 
Geary is distinguishable because it involved a more 
general claim of ineffective assistance of counsel rather than 
the specific conflict of interest claim as asserted by Webb. 
Additionally, Utah case law is clear that if an actual conflict 
exists, effective representation is lost regardless of a 
showing of prejudice. 
The State further argues that defendant was 
not prejudiced by the conflict of interest 
of his attorneys. But the assistance of 
counsel is among those constitutional rights 
so basic to a fair trial that their 
infraction can never be treated as harmless 
error.'0 Chapman v. California, . . . We 
believe there is error here, and need not 
inquire into whether the error was harmless, 
because of the fundamental nature of the 
constitutional rights involved. Holloway, 
supra. 
State v. Smith, supra. 
Applied here, Webb's proof of actual conflict requires 
reversal of his conviction without any other showing. 
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POINT II 
THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENT STATUTE WAS IMPROPERLY 
APPLIED TO WEBB'S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY. 
The increased penalty provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988), were improperly applied to 
appellant's conviction for aggravated robbery. Webb's argument 
is supported by well established principles of statutory 
construction that "ambiguities in criminal statutes must be 
resolved in favor of lenity." State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 
at 562, n, 3 (Utah 1987). 
The State responds by arguing that because the 1989 
Legislature amended the Aggravated Robbery statute by deleting 
"firearm" and substituting "dangerous weapon," appellant is 
precluded from prevailing on his claim. The State's argument, 
however, ignores the fact that Webb was convicted under the 
1988 Aggravated Robbery statute. The Legislature's amendment 
of the statute supports appellant's argument that in 1988 the 
statute was ambiguous. The State's argument does not address 
Webb's claim that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be 
resolved in his favor. Id. 
The State cites State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1986), for the proposition that the enhancement is applicable 
to an Aggravated Robbery conviction; however, the State's 
reliance on this case is misplaced. The issue of whether the 
enhancement was appropriately applied to an Aggravated Robbery 
-11-
conviction was never addressed by the Court in O'Brien. 
Rather, O'Brien dealt with the length of enhancement sentencing 
and supports appellant's argument that the maximum enhancement 
sentence that a court may impose is five years, a point 
conceded by the State. (Br. of Resp. p. 51-52.) 
The State also attempts to distinguish Simpson v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978), by arguing that "the Federal 
Bank Robbery statute did not include the use of a firearm as an 
element of the offense." The distinction raised by the State 
supports Webb's argument. The Court in Simpson refused to 
allow the piggy-backing of penalties for the same conduct. The 
Court held that the government could not impose two separate 
sentences for the use of a firearm. Applied here, the State 
should also be precluded from piggy-backing penalties. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts of this case present the perfect backdrop 
for this Court to address an important area of substantive law: 
Joint representation by the Legal Defenders Association of 
co-defendants in a criminal case. This Court should consider 
the public policy arguments including the appearances of 
impropriety and protection of the attorney-client privilege in 
finding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to 
all defendants and attorneys, including indigent defendants and 
publicly appointed counsel. Specifically, appellant 
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respectfully requests that this court reverse the conviction 
and grant defendant a new and separate trial with new counsel, 
free of any conflict or appearance of impropriety. 
DATED this Si day o f August, 1989. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Sally 0. McMinimee 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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